One in 10 subscribers of The Washington Post quit over an editorial policy with which they disagree. What happens when demands of early adopters become the reputational risk and obstacle for growth?

The Washington Post lost more than 250,000 subscribers, or 10% of its customer base, in an emotionally charged reaction after its billionaire owner Jeff Bezos decided against endorsing any candidate in the 2024 U.S. presidential election.

The emotions and stakes are high: As Americans vote, the world holds its breath. They choose, and the world will live with the consequences, too.

The former editor Marty Baron called the non-endorsement a “betrayal of the core principles of the Post” and suggested Bezos made the decision out of fear of Donald Trump’s pressure.

Bezos defended the decision as principled rather than a result of any “quid pro quo” — “presidential endorsements do nothing to tip the scales of an election,” he wrote, but “create a perception of [editorial] bias” at a time of rising distrust towards journalists and the media.

Estimating the boycott’s impact

The churn figure was reported by the Post but not officially confirmed. The company is private and doesn’t share its financials. 

If accurate, the potential revenue risk can be estimated at more than US$32 million over the next three years. This is based on the median three-year digital-only subscriber lifetime value of 79 national news brands worldwide benchmarking with INMA in Q2 2024.

The actual loss will likely be lower than the estimate as the cancelled subscriptions are not expiring right away, emotions may cool down, the Post is making a case for staying, and the upset subscribers may give it a chance and revoke the cancellation with one click. 

Any final loss would make the Post’s “Trump slump” a rare example of a consumer boycott impacting revenue. A comprehensive study of 502 boycotts in the United States found that, on average, they did not inflict any financial loss on the target companies.

History of newspaper endorsements in the United States

U.S. newspapers have been endorsing candidates in presidential elections at least since 1860 when the Chicago Tribune supported Abraham Lincoln. The Post has been endorsing candidates since 1976.

Endorsements are usually issued by editorial boards of opinion writers, which are independent from the newsroom and report directly to publishers. This organisational set-up is unique to the United States. 

Newspapers endorse candidates across the world, for example, in the U.K. in 2024 most national titles have voted Labour. In Europe, many newspapers have roots in political movements, parties, or unions.

Decades of research found endorsements had an impact on election outcomes to at least some extent. At the same time, academics confirmed a “blowback” risk on newspapers’ reputation, for example, if it endorsed a different candidate than favoured by the readers. While journalists believe news and opinion are separate, many readers can’t tell the difference.

More U.S. publishers decided not to endorse any presidential candidate in 2024. For example, the largest chain in the United States — Gannett Media, with more than 200 publications, including USA Today — made a similar announcement, as did the Los Angeles Times. Per last week’s YouGov survey, half of the public in the U.S. believes newspapers should not endorse candidates (47%), less than one-third (28%) believes they should, and 25% are not sure. 

But they are not reporting such strong pushback as the Post.

Why?

The democracy club

In his memoir Collision of Power, Marty Baron quoted letters from the Post readers received after Trump’s win in 2018: “We need you! You are the only defense against alternative facts.” 

A month later, the Post adopted a new motto: “Democracy dies in darkness.” It was printed every day under its nameplate, published on the Web home page, repeated in advertising. 

The Post launched its paywall in 2013, but the number of subscriptions barely reached 200,000  in 2017, per the company’s presentations at INMA events. 

Then, in 2018, the number spiked to a millionnand continued to grow during the Trump presidency and the COVID pandemic, reaching the peak of three million in 2020.

In Baron’s words: “Millions of Americans were prepared to participate in supporting democracy at that moment in U.S. history. They saw a subscription to The Post as a way to join the democracy club.”

Subscriptions as membership

In the essay “Post-journalism and the death of newspapers,” Russian-Canadian academic Andrey Mir reflected on what happened after the decline of advertising revenues had pushed journalism organisations to embrace paywalls.

The subscription model adapted to the rising political polarisation spurred by social networks: “The media has started pitching subscriptions as membership. The transactional offer of selling news has turned into philanthropy soliciting,” Mir wrote. 

The essay expanded on this theme: 

• With this shift, subscribers no longer pay for news (it’s free, anyway), but for “the public service of the media outlet, which pledged to cover certain social issues or just cover news from a certain angle.” 

• Members signing up for “noble causes” don’t necessarily pay to get news for themselves (they already know the news), but rather to set agendas and influence others.

Mir worried: “As the Trump bump showed, the most triggering issues are political topics that polarise the audience. Covering polarising issues for better soliciting of support, the media are incentivised to seek and reproduce polarisation for the next rounds of soliciting.”

Power of noble causes

Research supports the notion that many consumers subscribe to online news, including The Washington Post, motivated by noble causes rather than content or features.

A 2023 study of subscription advertisements found the most effective pitch informed audiences of the mission of journalism threatened by the news industry’s critical financial situation.

According to Digital News Report, an annual survey by Oxford’s Reuters Institute, 45% of those paid for online news worldwide in 2023 were motivated by the journalistic mission or the sense of shared identity with the news brand and what it stands for. (Quality or distinctive content? 51%.)

In the United States, noble motivations were even stronger (64%). Both readers leaning left and those leaning right similarly strived for the causes. Same was true for those who voted for Joe Biden as for Donald Trump in 2020, for rich and poor, and for women and men. 

But there were differences between brands, likely tied to their positioning. Per a 2021 survey, Washington Post readers were primarily driven by the noble cause of supporting journalism (72%), as opposed to The Wall Street Journal’s readers, who paid primarily for distinctive content (56%).

From “Trump bump” to slump

Marty Baron revealed in his book that after the 2020 election, Post subscriptions fell by nearly 500,000 or 17%: “Donald Trump was out of the White House, easing fears of many readers about his threat to democracy.”

Now, we learn, the subscriptions might have slumped further, as the Post’s non-endorsement outraged part of the readership who felt it betrayed its brand’s promise. 

Academic literature on the diffusion of ideas and products offers an additional perspective on interpreting what happened. At first, cause-driven subscription growth seemed like ideal product-market fit, but this was actually classic early adopter behaviour.

In Crossing the Chasm, Geoffrey Moore described the gap, or the chasm, between early adopters of products and mainstream markets. In news media’s case, this would be the difference between readers motivated by mission or identity, and readers seeking content or other services.

While the early adopters can kick-start a subscription, they cannot sustain the growth. There are only a few of them, their expectations are different from the mainstream, and their demands might be too costly. 

“To be successful, companies need to innovate for the consumers they want, not the ones they have,” advised J.P. Eggars of New York University.

Change as a campaign

Through this lens, Jeff Bezos’ decision looks strategic and calculated even if disappointing to editors of the Post and alienating some subscribers. Their loss might be acceptable and even seen as necessary for growth.

The way this change was introduced clearly backfired. Jeff Bezos acknowledged “inadequate planning” of the announcement. But if it was a principled decision, should he wait another four years to make everyone feel more comfortable or rather implement right away?

Harvard professor Rosabeth Moss Kanter famously argued that change is not a decision but a political campaign. To win hearts and minds, leaders need to aspire to higher principles, over-communicate, seek allies, empower them, and secure victories. Change is about people, and people resist change, so change requires time.

In news media’s case, this could include reframing the conversation around journalistic integrity, creating transparency around editorial decisions, finding forums for constructive dialogue with staff and readers, and demonstrating commitment and investment in fact-based reporting and utilities beyond news. 

Bezos’ op-ed reads like a manifesto: “While I do not and will not push my personal interest, I will also not allow this paper to stay on autopilot and fade into irrelevance — overtaken by unresearched podcasts and social media barbs — not without a fight.”

Journalism in a polarised world

The Post’s archrival — The New York Times — faced a similar “Trump bump” and the business challenge to cross the chasm, but it has spent years and millions expanding its value proposition beyond news. 

Per the recent financial report, 49% of 10.5 million digital-only subscribers signed up for the Times bundle of news, puzzles, cooking recipes, or product reviews. The bundle subscribers are more engaged and drive higher revenue than single-product subscribers.

The Times figured how to grow beyond early adopters, but it also faced pressure from staff and subscribers, and its editors debated its political role. Executive Editor Joe Kahn reportedly dismissed some of the criticism, as representative to only a fraction of the audience.

The Times Publisher A.G. Sulzberger publicly campaigned against the advocacy model of journalism. In an essay for Columbia Journalism Review, he described instances of the newspaper being mocked for “both-sidesism” and accused of “recklessness” or “treason” when its coverage was “helping Trump.” No publisher wants to face such criticism, but it perhaps comes with the job.

Sulzberger laid out his vision for journalism in the age of political polarisation and distrust in professional media: 

• Follow the facts wherever they lead. 

• Recommit to reporting as opposed to commentary or aggregation. 

• Increase transparency around the journalistic process and editorial decision-making.

• Listen to the public’s concerns and communicate more to protect the reputation.

Still, the Times’ editorial board endorsed Vice President Kamala Harris as “the only patriotic choice for president.” 

These two highly respected and admired newspapers have been facing similar dilemmas, challenges, and shared concerns about the future of journalism. But they made different calls on political endorsements. Isn’t it proof of their independence?

Greg’s Readers First newsletter is a public face of a revenue and media subscriptions initiative by INMA, outlined here. INMA members can subscribe here.

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